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Abstract
We examine the channels and efficacy of monetary policy at the zero lower bound
(ZLB) through the lens of shadow rate models. We compare estimates across models
with various factor structures and different assumptions about interest rate forecasts.
We confirm that calendar-based forward guidance discretely shifted the implied duration of the ZLB and that large scale asset purchases (LSAPs) primarily lowered term
premia. However, we find that the real effects of monetary policy are more muted relative to prior estimates: a 1 standard deviation fall in the shadow rate causes a peak
decline in the unemployment rate of 0.003-0.01%.
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Introduction

Between 2008 and 2015, the Federal Reserve lowered its policy interest rate to the zero lower
bound (ZLB) and employed new tools – large scale asset purchases (LSAPs) and forward
guidance – to influence long-term interest rates. The consensus among policymakers is that
these new tools were effective (Caldara et al. (2020)). However, the channels through which
they operated are still not well understood. In particular, the nonlinearity resulting from the
ZLB makes it difficult to separately identify interest-rate expectations from term premia in
standard term-structure affine models. Despite the challenges of identifying how these new
policies worked, the Federal Reserve employed similar strategies in response to the COVID19 recession. Hence, understanding the effects and channels of monetary policy at the ZLB
remains an important question.
Shadow rate models are a common tool for analyzing the effects of unconventional monetary policy. The shadow rate is the counterfactual one-period interest rate that would have
obtained absent the ZLB (Black (1995)). Shadow rate models combine a time series process
for the stochastic discount factor of financial market participants, the absence of arbitrage,
and an effective lower bound on short-term interest rates. The path of the shadow rate reflects market expectations of the length of time that short-term interest rates would remain
beneath its lower bound. These models have been used to summarize the stance of monetary
policy and to evaluate its real effects (Wu and Xia (2016); Bauer and Rudebusch (2016)).
In this paper, we estimate a number of shadow rate models of U.S. Treasury forward rates
in order to investigate the channels and efficacy of monetary policy at the ZLB. By comparing
across numerous specifications of factor structure, data used in estimation, and structural
assumptions about that data, we can determine which conclusions are robust and which are
not. Our estimation procedure innovates in two dimensions relative to prior work. First, we
use a fully non-linear estimator (the discretization filter developed in Farmer (2021)), which
allows us to combine data before, during, and after the 2008-15 ZLB period in estimation.
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Previous work (e.g., Wu and Xia (2016)) has relied on the extended Kalman filter, which
locally linearizes to evaluate the likelihood of the data, or has estimated the parameters on
pre-ZLB data alone (e.g. Bauer and Rudebusch (2016)). Using the discretization filter allows
us to explore whether the choice of estimation method appreciably affects the properties of
shadow rate estimates.
We extend Farmer’s filter to incorporate missing observations, which enables our second
innovation: incorporating survey forecasts of average short-term interest rates into the estimated shadow rate. Although the use of survey forecasts is somewhat common in the affine
term structure literature (see for example, Kim and Orphanides (2012)), to our knowledge
we are the first to utilize this data in shadow rate estimation. The use of survey forecasts
gives us information about the parameters governing the physical short rate process and
allows the exploration of different models of forecast formation. In total, we estimate six
different models: two- and three-factor models without forecasts, with “rational” forecasts,
and “subjective” forecasts. Across our six models, no particular model is favored by (in- and
out-of-sample) measures of fit.
With our estimates in hand, we revisit a number of important questions concerning the
effects of monetary policy on financial markets and the macroeconomy during and after the
Great Recession. First, we examine the shadow rates themselves and the model-implied
real-time beliefs about the duration of the zero lower bound. Our models generally produce
deeper estimates of the shadow rate in the ZLB period than Wu and Xia (2016) and the level
of the shadow rate differs markedly across models. However, all of our estimates qualitatively
agree that markets persistently expected a much shorter duration of the ZLB in the early
stage of the Great Recession than occurred ex-post. Our results suggest that the introduction
of calendar-based forward guidance in 2011 led to a discrete upward reassessment of ZLB
duration (by 4-9 months depending on the model). Five of the six models imply the expected
liftoff from the ZLB conformed to the FOMC’s calendar-based forward guidance. These
findings broadly align with prior work on the expected liftoff from the ZLB (Swanson and
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Williams (2014)) and suggest that calendar-based forward guidance was effective at shaping
the beliefs (and behavior) of market participants.
Second, we examine the effect of monetary policy on the macroeconomy using our shadow
rate estimates. A large literature has used the Wu and Xia (2016) estimates to replace the
federal funds rate during the ZLB period. We estimate an identical Factor-Augmented VAR
(FAVAR) as in Wu and Xia (2016) and find evidence of a structural break in either the effects
of the lagged policy rate on macroeconomic variables or lagged macroeconomic variables on
the policy rate for five of the models. This finding suggests caution in the use of shadow
rates for applied work that spans this time period. Given the evidence of a structural break,
we estimate a Markov-switching FAVAR (MSFAVAR) using our estimated shadow rates
to account for potentially different regimes in the conduct and effects of monetary policy.
We find that a 1 standard deviation surprise monetary easing lowered the unemployment
rate by between 0.003% and 0.01% during the “unconventional” policy regime during the
2008-15 ZLB period. These estimated magnitudes are much smaller than in the existing
literature (e.g. Wu and Xia (2016) and Corrado et al. (2021)) and are insignificant in some
specifications.
Third, we use the estimated models to decompose the yield curve into the expectations
hypothesis (EH) component of yields and term premia. We find that the first round of
LSAPs largely affected long-term yields by reducing term premia, a result that is consistent
with earlier findings (Gagnon et al. (2011)). The magnitude of the fall in term premia differs
across models; however, the models that use survey data tend to attribute a larger portion
of the change to reductions in the path of short rates. At a minimum, this result suggests a
non-trivial role for unconventional monetary policy affecting yields via a signaling channel
or path channel, as argued by Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011) and Bauer and
Rudebusch (2016). Finally, we study the predicted effects of LSAPs on available Treasury
supply and composition using the framework established in D’Amico et al. (2012). Like in
that paper, we find effects largely attributable to changes in duration; however, we do not
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find strong evidence supporting an economically important channel for “local scarcity” of
medium-to-long term Treasuries.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section reviews the relevant literature. Section 3
describes the shadow rate model, our information assumptions, and the estimation. Section 4
discusses the estimation results and the implied paths of the shadow rate; section 5 examines
the macroeconomic and policy applications of our estimates, followed by the conclusion.

2

Literature Review

Our paper contributes to the growing literature on shadow interest rates, originated by Black
(1995). Wu and Xia (2016) is the closest paper to ours; they use a non-linear approximation
for forward rates (which we also adopt) for a three-variable latent factor model. They argue
that their estimated shadow rate can be used to replace the effective federal funds rate in
monetary VARs. Since their rate is widely used in applied work, we highlight comparisons
between their results and ours throughout the rest of the paper. Bauer and Rudebusch
(2016) estimate a term structure model with macroeconomic and (latent) financial factors
using data from prior to the ZLB period associated with the Great Recesssion. They then
use simulations over the ZLB period to find the modal forecast of the shadow rate. Their
paper emphasizes the sensitivity of shadow rate level estimates to model specifications, a
theme we explore in other dimensions. Gust et al. (2017) estimate a shadow rate in the
context of a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model. We differ from these papers by
jointly explaining forecasts and forward rates, by generalizing the forecast formation process,
and using a fully nonlinear estimation method.
Several papers in the affine term structure literature have also incorporated forecasts into
estimation – for example, Kim and Wright (2005), Wright (2011), and Kim and Orphanides
(2012). Piazzesi et al. (2015) show that risk premia constructed using survey forecasts have
different time series properties than those typically calculated from market data alone. We
detail the relationship of our paper to Piazzesi et al. (2015) in more detail in section 3.
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Relative to these papers, we explicitly jointly account for survey forecasts and the ZLB in
our framework.
A related literature connects forecast expectations to financial variables explicitly. Colacito et al. (2016) develop an equity pricing model that includes variance and skewness
of professional forecasts, which they treat as exogenous. Barillas and Nimark (2018) and
Struby (2018) estimate affine term structure models with dispersed information and survey
forecasts. These papers do not incorporate the ZLB.
We contribute to a large literature attempting to measure the effects of Federal Reserve
policy at the zero lower bound, especially forward guidance and LSAPs. Many of these
papers, such as Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011) and Nakamura and Steinsson (2018b) use event studies (in part) to measure the impact of policy announcements.1
Gagnon et al. (2011) use an event study and a reduced-form model of the term premium to
measure the effects of LSAPs. Wright (2012) estimates a VAR, identifying monetary policy
shocks using heteroskedasticity, as well as an event study approach, and finds that monetary
stimulus at the ZLB has a short-lived effect on longer-term Treasury yields and corporate
yields. Hanson and Stein (2015) find large effects of FOMC announcements over a sample
that includes the ZLB period. Bauer and Rudebusch (2014) estimate a suite of affine term
structure models at a daily frequency to distinguish between the effect on term premia versus changes in the path of short rates (what they label the forward guidance effect). Their
interest is on characterizing how model and parameter uncertainty affects the assessment of
the two channels.
We differ from most of these papers by jointly estimating the dynamics of forecasts and
forward rates in a structural model. The advantage of our approach is that it allows us to
not just measure the raw effect of LSAPs, but understand the changes in expectations of
short rates and risk premia, assess the perceived duration of the ZLB as it evolved over time,
and examine the robustness of our results to different structural assumptions. D’Amico
1

Martin and Milas (2012) and Swanson (2018) survey this literature.

6

and King (2012) and Li and Wei (2013) examine the effects of changes in supply from
LSAPs on term premia estimated using affine term structure models; we examine whether
their interpretation of supply effects is robust to term premia estimated using shadow rate
models.
Lastly, we contribute to a literature examining whether unconventional monetary policy
stimulated real economic activity during the ZLB. Wu and Xia (2016) estimate a FAVAR
using their shadow rate as the policy rate during the ZLB period associated with the Great
Recession; they find monetary policy was effective at lowering the unemployment rate during
this period. Corrado et al. (2021) find a similar result using the Wu and Xia (2016) and
Krippner (2015) shadow rate estimates in the context of a Markov-switching FAVAR. We
revisit these results using our suite of estimates based on alternative model specifications.

3

The shadow rate model and discretization filter

This section contains the details of the shadow rate model and estimation procedure. First,
we outline the shadow rate model, following Wu and Xia (2016). Following that, we explain
the alternative information assumptions we use to map the forecast data into the shadow
rate model. Finally, we discuss estimation.

3.1

The Wu-Xia Shadow Rate Model

Following Wu and Xia (2016), the nominal short rate rt is given by

rt = max(r, st )

(1)

The shadow rate st is affine in the state vector Xt :

st = δ0 + δ1 Xt

(2)

The stochastic discount factor Mt+1 is exponentially affine, and is related to the prices
of risk λt and innovations to the state εt+1 :
7

1
ln Mt+1 ≡ mt+1 = −rt − λ′t λt − λ′t εt+1
2

(3)

The prices of risk are themselves a linear function of the state:

λt = λ0 + λ1 Xt

(4)

Using the superscript Q to indicate the risk-neutral probabiltiy measure, the law of
motion for fundamental factors under the risk neutral measure is

Q
Q
Xt+1 = µQ + ρQ Xt + ΣεQ
t+1 εt+1 ∼ N (0, I)

(5)

Under the physical measure, the law of motion is:

Xt+1 = µ + ρXt + Σεt+1 εt+1 ∼ N (0, I)

(6)

The change of measure is related to the prices of risk (the λ terms) and the sizes of risks
that bond traders face (Σ) in the following way:

µ − µQ = Σλ0

(7)

ρ − ρQ = Σλ1

(8)

Finally, we denote the forward rate from t + n to t + n + 1 as

fn,n+1,t = (n + 1)yn+1,t − nyn,t

(9)

where yn,t is the log yield on a zero coupon bond bond that pays a dollar at time t + n.
Given this setup,
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SR
fn,n+1,t


≈r+

σnQ g

an + b n X t − r
σnQ


(10)

where

g(z) = zΦ(z) + ϕ(z)

(11)

Φ(·) and ϕ(·) are a standard normal CDF and PDF, respectively (see Wu and Xia (2016)
for details). an and bn are nonlinear expressions of the prices of risk and parameters governing
the state, and are defined explicitly in Appendix A.

3.2

Incorporating forecast survey data

We deviate from Wu and Xia (2016) and other earlier shadow rate estimates by incorporating forecasts data in the estimation. We utilize the Blue Chip Financial Forecasts survey,
which is a monthly publication that collects macroeconomic and financial forecasts of market
participants’ beliefs over subsequent quarters.2 We use the average forecasts of the 3-month
constant-maturity Treasury bill yield to construct paths of average expected short-term rates
over different horizons. We identify forecasts with the average short rate implied by the physical measure over the relevant horizon. Using analogous steps in the derivation of forward
rates under the risk-neutral measure, one can show that expected short rates under the
physical measure are

Et [rt+n ] ≈ r +

σnP g

aPn + bPn Xt − r
σnP


(12)

where
" n−1
#
X
aPn ≡ δ0 + δ1
(ρ)j µ

(13)

j=0
2

In Appendix B we show that the average forecast from the survey is consistent with short-term asset
prices.
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bPn ≡ δ1 (ρ)n

(σtP )

≡

VarPt

=

n−1
X



δ1 (ρ)j ΣΣ′ (ρ′ )j δ1′

(14)

(15)

j=0

Because the Blue Chip survey asks questions about quarterly averages, the horizon over
which respondents are actually forecasting varies depending on the survey month. We account for this by extracting the purely forward-looking component from current-quarter
forecasts (see Appendix C). Forecasts at horizons beyond the current quarter are raw average forecasts provided by the survey. Depending on the survey month, the horizon over which
the survey reflects a forecast is changing, which we adjust for in our estimation method.
Alternative assumptions on forecasts The affine term structure literature has incorporated short-term interest rate forecasts using a variety of assumptions. Kim and Orphanides
(2012) propose estimating affine term structure models by incorporating forecasts to reduce
small-sample problems and improve precision of estimates. They treat average forecasts as
generated under the physical measure and full information rational expectations (FIRE), and
observed with i.i.d. measurement error. We refer to estimates made using these assumptions
as “KO” estimates for brevity, in contrast to models that do not incorporate survey forecasts,
which we call yields-only models (“YO”). We assume this measurement error has a constant
variance across forecast horizons.
A large literature has documented that there are aspects of forecast surveys that are
inconsistent with FIRE. In Appendix B, we show that forecast errors are predictable in economically and statistically significant ways. Because we are interested in whether our results
are sensitive to the choice of how to add forecasts into the model, we also estimate models
using a different strategy following Piazzesi et al. (2015). They use short rate forecasts to
construct “subjective” interest rate expectations and risk premia using quarterly data. They
estimate a statistical model of yields and expected inflation, and then estimate parameters
10

governing the risk-neutral measure and a subjective “distorted” measure in a second step by
minimizing mean square error between the model-implied yields and forecasts. We modify
their approach along several dimensions. In addition to estimating a model with the ZLB,
we focus on forecasts of three-month Treasuries at horizons of 1-18 months ahead. We also
estimate the dynamics of the physical, risk neutral, and distorted measure jointly in a single
(quasi-) maximum likelihood step. Like Piazzesi et al. (2015), we assume that forecasts are
formed under a “distorted” physical measure as in equation (12), but with ρ replaced by

ρ − Σk
where k is a conformable matrix of parameters that govern the degree of distortion. We
also allow for i.i.d. measurement error in forecasts. We refer to this set of estimates as the
“PSS” model. In some figures, we compare results based on our estimates to those of Wu
and Xia (2016). We label their results as “WX” for brevity.

3.3

Estimation details

This section contains details about the factor structure, mapping of the model into a statespace representation, and the estimation details.
3.3.1

Factor normalization and structure

We estimate the parameters governing the physical dynamics of our latent risk factors ((5)
and (6)) and the prices of risk parameters λ0 and λ1 . For three-factor models, we impose
a similar normalization as Joslin et al. (2011) and Wu and Xia (2016) for the risk neutral
factors:
 
1
 

δ1′ = 
1
 
0
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(16)

(17)

µQ = 0

We also assume ρQ is in real Jordan form with eigenvalues in descending order and Σ
is lower triangular. Unlike Wu and Xia (2016), we do not impose a repeated eigenvalue in
estimation. We also estimate two-factor versions of each model with analogous restrictions
following Krippner (2015).
3.3.2

The nonlinear state-space representation

Throughout, we assume that the state equation is a VAR(1). The physical dynamics of
the fundamental states are as in equation (6). The observed forward rate is the same as in
equation (10) augmented with measurement error:

fn,n+1,t = r +

σnQ g

an + b′n Xt − r
σnQ


+ ωent

(18)

where ω is a measurement error parameter common across horizons and ent ∼ N(0, 1).
We allow this measurement error to have a different variance than the measurement error
of forecasts. Generically, we collect observables by stacking them in an observation equation
Gt (Xt ).
3.3.3

Details of the estimation procedure

The data runs from 1987-2018 at a monthly frequency. Forward rates are constructed using
the Gürkaynak et al. (2007) yield curve estimates and averaged over the month (to align the
data with the Blue Chip question wording).
We estimate the nonlinear state space model using the discretization filter proposed by
Farmer (2021). Farmer’s discretization filter approximates the state distribution on a discrete
grid. We use the method outlined in Gospodinov and Lkhagvasuren (2014) to approximate
the state distribution, choosing grid points to approximate the first two moments of the
underlying Gaussian VAR. We then use Gt (Xt ) to calculate predicted values of the observable
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forward rates and forecasts at each point on the grid. Treating each point as a regime for the
data, the likelihood is estimated in a method similar to the Hamilton (1989) filter. Standard
errors on parameter estimates are QMLE standard errors as in Hamilton (1989). We estimate
smoothed states via an appropriately modified version of Kim’s smoother (Kim (1994)).
We adopt the discretization filter, rather than using the extended Kalman filter (EKF)
as in Wu and Xia (2016). Both involve approximation: the discretization filter approximates
the state space on a grid, while the EKF linearizes the observation and state equations
locally. Farmer (2021) shows in the context of a different model that the discretization
filter can achieve lower root mean square error and bias than the EKF. Although a detailed
comparison of the two methods is beyond the scope of the paper, we present results from
estimating a three-factor, yields-only version of the model in Appendix G. For that model,
the within-sample fits for both the EKF and the discretization filter are similar. However,
the out-of-sample performance of the discretization filter models is superior.3

4

Estimation results

In this section we discuss parameter estimates and model fit, and present the estimated
shadow rates and implied ZLB duration.

4.1

Parameter estimates and model fit

We report parameter estimates for all models in Appendix D. The estimated zero lower
bound varies across models between 11 and 20 basis points. This is below the 25 basis
points Wu and Xia (2016) assumed, but slightly above that used in Federal Reserve Board
staff estimates in 2012 (around 10 basis points).
The models fit the yield curve well in sample. Appendix Figure D.1 shows the average
yield curve predicted during the ZLB period versus the data. Each model appears to capture the shifts and changes in the shape of the yield curve during the ZLB period and the
3

More practically, while the EKF is certainly faster than the discretization filter for the yields-only
models, we found that it was much slower for models incorporating forecasts. This made it much more
computationally burdensome to conduct the pseudo-out-of-sample exercise we used to compare across models.
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nonlinearity at the short end.
In terms of comparisons across models, the three-factor models achieve higher likelihoods
than the two-factor models, and the PSS model achieves a higher likelihood than the KO
model conditional on the number of factors.4 However, as shown in panel A of Table 1, the
three-factor YO model is favored by in-sample measures of root mean square error (RMSE)
and mean absolute error (MAE) in fitting forward rates.5
We also examine out-of-sample fit in a pseudo-real-time forecasting exercise for the ZLB
period. Starting in 2007, we estimate the model parameters using only the data available
as of December of that year. We then forecast forward rates at monthly horizons 1- to
12-months ahead, and we re-estimate adding the subsequent 12 months of data. Hence, for
forward rates of each maturity, we have 120 (10 estimates of 12 horizons) sets of forecasts.6
Panel B of Table 1 displays the RMSE and MAE from this exercise. As shown in that
panel, the two-factor KO and three-factor PSS models perform better out-of-sample for
short-maturity bonds, while the three-factor YO and KO models perform better for longmaturity bonds (although the advantages over the PSS models are not large). Because there
is no clear “winner” among different measures of in- and out-of-sample fit, we base our
subsequent analysis on the entire suite of models to highlight where they display consensus
and disagreement for a range of policy questions.

4.2

Shadow rate estimates and duration of the ZLB period

Figure 1 shows our shadow rate estimates alongside the Wu and Xia (2016) estimates during
the ZLB period. We also indicate a selection of policy event dates during this period. The
level of our estimates is generally lower than that estimated by Wu and Xia (2016), and
the PSS level estimates are generally lower than the YO and KO estimates. Our estimates
4

The PSS model with three-factors is also overwhelmingly preferred by the Bayesian information criterion
among the four models that use forecast data.
5
Note that unlike the KO and PSS models, the YO model is not trying to simultaneously match both
prices and forecasts.
6
Because of the computational burden of estimating the model, re-estimating for each additional month
of data is infeasible.
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Table 1: Table reports model fits. Columns 1-6 report estimates for the mean absolute error
(MAE) and Columns 7-12 report estimates for the root-mean-square error (RMSE) across
models. Panel A contains estimates for the in-sample fit that uses all observations (384
months). Panel B contains estimates for the out-of-sample fit, which estimates the model
each December from 2007-2018, and calculates forecasts for 1- to 12-months ahead. MAE
and RMSE are reported across all horizons (10 sets of forecasts at 12 horizons each).
Statistic
Model
Factors
3mo
6mo
12mo
24mo
60mo
84mo
120mo
3mo
6mo
12mo
24mo
60mo
84mo
120mo

MAE
RMSE
YO
KO
PS
KO
PS
2
3
2
3
2
3
2
3
2
3
2
3
Panel A: In-Sample Fit (N=384)
0.20 0.09 0.29 0.22 0.22 0.18 0.25 0.11 0.38 0.30 0.29 0.23
0.13 0.07 0.29 0.32 0.20 0.16 0.16 0.08 0.40 0.45 0.27 0.22
0.14 0.08 0.32 0.44 0.22 0.21 0.18 0.10 0.44 0.59 0.29 0.26
0.19 0.08 0.33 0.43 0.24 0.26 0.25 0.09 0.42 0.53 0.30 0.31
0.15 0.10 0.20 0.22 0.18 0.17 0.19 0.13 0.26 0.29 0.22 0.22
0.11 0.09 0.16 0.18 0.17 0.15 0.14 0.11 0.20 0.23 0.22 0.18
0.18 0.13 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.22 0.22 0.16 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28
Panel B: Out-of-Sample Fit: 1-12 month-ahead forecasts (N=120)
0.19 0.21 0.22 0.26 0.43 0.16 0.26 0.30 0.32 0.36 0.60 0.25
0.24 0.27 0.24 0.25 0.49 0.19 0.34 0.38 0.31 0.33 0.68 0.27
0.29 0.35 0.27 0.27 0.63 0.28 0.48 0.52 0.37 0.36 0.83 0.36
0.41 0.44 0.37 0.41 0.76 0.41 0.64 0.67 0.53 0.58 0.99 0.59
0.55 0.57 0.56 0.55 0.68 0.58 0.75 0.77 0.72 0.77 0.99 0.80
0.60 0.62 0.70 0.57 0.73 0.66 0.77 0.79 0.83 0.75 1.00 0.85
0.69 0.65 0.82 0.66 0.89 0.78 0.86 0.82 1.00 0.82 1.13 0.98
YO

also appear to react more strongly to the first two rounds of LSAPs and the introduction of
calendar-based forward guidance/MEP than that of Wu and Xia. Conditional on the “type”
of model – YO, KO, and PSS – the number of factors also appears to influence the level of
the shadow rate.
The level of the shadow rate reflects the speed with which short-term interest rates are
projected to revert to their mean. Arguably, when short-term interest rates rise above their
lower bound is more informative. We translate the level of the shadow rate to the implied
belief about how long short rates will remain at the ZLB. This duration is shown in Figure
2. All of our models suggest that market participants initially under-predicted the (ex-post)
duration of the zero lower bound. In 2009 and 2010, the implied date of liftoff is one to two
15

Figure 1: Smoothed estimates of shadow rate during/post Great Recession, with event dates
(three rounds of Large Scale Asset Purchases (LSAPs), the introduction of calendar-based
forward guidance and the Maturity Extension Program (FG+MEP), Taper Announcement).
FG and MEP were introduced in August and September 2011, respectively, but are shown
in August 2011.
years ahead.
In August 2011, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) introduced specific calendarbased forward guidance in their Statement of Economic Projections (SEP). In Figure 2, the
black dashed lines indicate the range of dates for target rate liftoff implied by the SEP.
These dates are shown as a range because they are only reported using end-of-quarter or
end-of-year estimates for the federal funds rate. The introduction of calendar-based forward
guidance corresponded with a discrete upward reassessment of the expected ZLB duration.
16

Figure 2: Real-time implied mean duration of ZLB period. Bands indicate 99th percentile
of liftoff dates.
We display this effect in Figure 3, which uses the same estimates as those in the previous
figure, but focuses on the period surrounding the introduction of the guidance. Averaging
across models, the point estimates suggest that calendar-based forward guidance extended
the market’s estimate of the ZLB duration by about seven months.
Although the models do not agree on the precise month of liftoff even after the introduction of calendar-based forward guidance, all of the models agree that liftoff would occur
sometime after mid-2013. Five of the six models suggest market participants’ beliefs were
consistent with the SEP’s guidance of “exceptionally low levels for the federal funds rate at
least through mid-2013,” while the three-factor KO model suggests that market participants
believed that rate increases would occur later than the FOMC was projecting at the time.
In short, our results confirm that markets initially under-estimated how long interest
rates would remain at their lower bound in 2008 and 2009. Moreover, calendar-based forward
guidance successfully extended the market perceived duration of the ZLB, although the exact
degree to which that occurred differs across models.
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Figure 3: Real-time implied mean duration of 2011 using the same estimates as those in
Figure 2.

5

Monetary policy during and after the Great Recession

In the previous section, we showed how beliefs about the effective liftoff of monetary policy
evolved over the course of the ZLB period. In this section, we explore how novel monetary
policy tools affected asset prices and the macroeconomy during this period, viewed through
the lens of our estimates.
We conduct four exercises. First, we test whether there was a structural break during this
period; we find evidence of a break in five of six models. This cautions against using the level
of the shadow rate as a measure of the monetary policy stance during the ZLB period without
accounting for structural or regime changes. In light of this finding, we proceed to estimate a
Markov-switching FAVAR to assess the effects of policy shocks on macroeconomic variables.
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Across all models, we find that the magnitude of the impulse responses of the inflation and
unemployment rates to monetary shocks are much smaller than those estimated using the
Wu and Xia (2016) shadow rate. We also generally find that the effects of monetary policy
shocks are larger in the “unconventional” regime (which approximately corresponds with the
ZLB period). Third, we examine the effects of policy announcements on term premia. We
find substantial reductions in yields and term premia around the first two rounds of LSAPs
and the introduction of calendar-based forward guidance, but not for the third round of
LSAPs. While these results are broadly consistent across models, the PSS model finds more
muted effects (and hence stronger effects on interest rate expectations). Fourth, we relate
our term premia estimates to measures of Treasury supply and duration in the pre-ZLB
period and decompose the first round of LSAPs into different supply channels. Consistent
with prior studies, we find that term premia fell as aggregate duration was removed from the
market. We do not find large effects from the “local supply” of Treasuries after conditioning
on duration.

5.1

Structural break test

Following Wu and Xia (2016), we estimate a Factor-Augmented Vector Autoregression
(FAVAR) as in Bernanke et al. (2005), where we substitute the shadow rate for the effective federal funds rate when policy rates are constrained. We use the same data and
specification as Wu and Xia (2016) to estimate the FAVAR. The unrestricted model is:
 


Ft 
Ft−1 
  =1t<Dec 2007 B1 (L) 

st
st−1


Ft−1 
+ 1t>Dec 2007 & < July 2009 B2 (L) 

st−1


Ft−1 
+ 1t≥ July 2009 B3 (L) 
 + vt
st−1
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Wu & Xia 2016 0.289 1.000
YO
1.000 0.001
YO 2 factor
0.989 0.015
KO
0.004 1.000
KO 2 factor
0.059 1.000
PSS
0.017 0.968
PSS 2 factor
0.324 0.574
Table 2: First column: p-values for test of structural break in effect of lagged shadow rate
on macroeconomic factors. Second column: p-values for test of structural break in effect of
lagged macroeconomic factors on shadow rate. Null is no structural break.
By construction the macroeconomic factors (Ft ) have been purged of effects from the
policy/shadow rate, and the variance-covariance matrix of the structural shocks vt is lower
triangular.
The null hypothesis of the structural break test is that sub-elements of B1 (L) and B3 (L)
are equal. The first column of Table 2 reports the p-value for the coefficients of lagged
shadow rates vis-a-vis the macroeconomic factors. We reject this null at the 5% level for the
KO and PSS three-factor models, and at the 10% level for the KO two-factor model. The
second column reports the p-value for the coefficients of lagged macroeconomic factors on
shadow rates. We reject the null for both YO models. In short, for five of the six models,
we find at least some of the VAR coefficients significantly differed after July 2009, relative
to before the crisis.

This result cautions against assuming continuity in macro-monetary

policy relationships before and after the Great Recession.7

5.2

MSFAVAR results

Because we find evidence of a structural break in the conventional FAVAR, we use a Markovswitching FAVAR (MSFAVAR) model to examine the effectiveness of policy shocks. Our
particular implementation follows Huber and Fischer (2018).8 Consistent with Huber and
7

This result is in contrast to Wu and Xia (2016)’s suggestion that “the continuity of our shadow rate
allows researchers to update their favorite VAR during and post the ZLB period.” While it is true that their
shadow rate does not appear to have a structural break during and after the ZLB period associated with the
Great Recession, this appears to be more specific to their estimates.
8
Corrado et al. (2021) similarly estimate a MSFAVAR using the Wu and Xia (2016) and Krippner (2015)
shadow rate estimates to study the effectiveness of monetary policy at the ZLB; we compare the results using
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Fischer (2018), we allow for transition probabilities between states to be time-varying and
depending on a set of observable variables. Define Yt to be a vector of macroeconomic variables. A subset of these data include all variables that are assumed to be measured without
error (Yto ) (in our application, the annual CPI inflation rate, the civilian unemployment rate,
and the federal funds/shadow rate). In our setting, we estimate the MSFAVAR separately
using the shadow rate from each of our six models, as well as from the Wu and Xia (2016)
rate. Define Ft as a vector of unobserved macroeconomic variables extracted from Yt using
principal component analysis. The observation equation is given by:

Yt =ΛF Ft + Λo Yto + et

(19)

where the upper K × K block of ΛF is an identity matrix, the upper K × N block of Λo
equals zero, and et is an N × 1 vector normally distributed errors with diagonal variancecovariance matrix Σe . Similar to Huber and Fischer (2018), we allow Zt = [Ft′ , (Yto )′ ]′ to
follow a regime-switching VAR:

Zt =aSt +

Q
X

Ai,St zt−i + ϵt

(20)

i=1

In equation 20, St is an indicator variable equal to 0 in the “conventional” regime and
1 in the “unconventional” regime. ϵt is a normal distributed error term with mean zero
and variance-covariance matrix Σϵ,St . The constant term aSt and coefficient matrices Ai,St
are allowed to vary across states. We identify regimes by assuming that the constant term
corresponding to the federal funds/shadow rate (j-th position of the vector ASt ) is larger in
the conventional relative to the unconventional state:

aj,St =0 > aj,St =1 .

(21)

We estimate the MSFAVAR using the shadow rate from our six models from 1987-2018.
Wu and Xia (2016)’s estimates to our six models.
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For macroeconomic data, we use a set of 98 variables from McCracken and Ng (2015),
transformed to be stationary. We choose K = 3 macro factors and include Q = 13 months of
lags.9 We also estimate a version using the updated WX estimates for the 1990-2018 period.
We simulate 70,000 draws, with the first 35,000 discarded as burn-in. Figure 4 displays
the time-varying transition probabilities of the likelihood of switching to the unconventional
state (St = 1) conditional on being in the conventional state (St = 0). We find that these
probabilities increased substantially at the beginning of the ZLB in 2008 and remained
elevated until approximately 2015.
1
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Figure 4: MSFAVAR Transition Probabilities: This figure displays estimates of the mean
probabilities of transitioning to the unconventional regime, conditional on being in the conventional regime.
Figure 5 reports impulse responses from the MSFAVAR to an unexpected one-standard
deviation easing in the federal funds/shadow rate. Estimates calculated for the conventional
(unconventional) regime are shown in blue (red). We highlight two primary results from this
analysis. First, using the WX estimates, we find that an unexpected decrease in the shadow
rate leads to higher inflation and lower unemployment rates on impact in both regimes. Second, across all of the six models that we consider, the magnitudes of the estimated elasticities
are substantially smaller (or their posterior confidence intervals include zero). To provide
9

For additional detail on implementing the MSFAVAR, we refer the reader to Huber and Fischer (2018)
and Corrado et al. (2021).
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Figure 5: MSFAVAR IRFs: This figure displays impulse responses of the federal
funds/shadow rate (upper panel), the annual CPI inflation rate (middle panel), and the
unemployment rate (lower panel) to a one-standard deviation monetary shock. Estimates
calculated for the conventional (unconventional) regime are shown in blue (red). The units
of the horizontal axis are the number of months from the initial monetary shock. For each
model, the solid line displays the median estimate and the shaded bands indicate 68% confidence intervals.
context, consider an unexpected one-standard deviation decline in the fed funds/shadow rate
in the unconventional regime. Using the WX estimates, we find that this shock has large
and persistent effects on the unemployment rate, peaking at -0.037% after 20 months. This
is similar to the magnitude of the effect estimated in Wu and Xia (2016), albeit eight months
after their peak. In contrast, 20 months after the initial shock, the response of the unemployment rate was significantly different from zero in only the 3-factor models. The magnitudes
of these estimates were much smaller than the WX responses: -0.011% (YO), -0.003% (KO),
and -0.009% (PSS) .10 According to our estimates, while monetary policy does seem to be
10

In Appendix G, we show that the impulse responses obtained from a version of the YO3 model estimated
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effective at stimulating the real economy, we find dramatically reduced magnitudes of these
effects relative to previous studies.

5.3

Decomposition of yields around policy events

Changes to the stance of monetary policy can simultaneously affect both expected future
short-term rates and expected future risk premia.11 We use our estimates of shadow rate
paths to decompose changes in the monthly 10-year Treasury yield following select Federal
Reserve unconventional policy event dates during the ZLB period. The effect of unconventional policy on term premia is debated in the literature. For example, Gagnon et al. (2011)
argue that early asset purchases were consistent with a portfolio rebalancing channel through
which the reduction in supply of long-duration assets reduced term premia and hence longterm yields.12 Swanson (2018) finds that LSAPs affected long term yields, while forward
guidance affected short-term yields. But Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011) attribute some change in yields to changes in the expectations hypothesis effects and Bauer
and Rudebusch (2014) attribute roughly 40-50% of the reduction in 10-year yields around
LSAP events to changes in policy rate expectations.
Using our collection of models, we decompose rates on 10-year Treasuries into their
expectations hypothesis and term premium components, in order to understand whether
our results suggest these events primarily operated through term premia or not.13 Figure
6 displays the 10-year U.S. Treasury yield in black along with the EH component of yields
calculated from each model. The decomposition shows that the 10-year yield experienced
steep declines in the months of major early Fed policy announcements. For example, between
using the extended Kalman filter are qualitatively similar over a two-year horizon to those estimated with
the WX shadow rate. An exception is the unemployment response, which is much larger than the WX
estimate – with the largest median effect of approximately a 0.06% decrease in unemployment after about
20 months. However, the posterior confidence bands between the two models overlap to an extent.
11
Hanson and Stein (2015) find significant effects of changes in the two-year U.S. Treasury yield on longterm real rates in a two-day window of FOMC announcements. In contrast, Nakamura and Steinsson
(2018a) provide high-frequency evidence that term premia are virtually unaffected by monetary policy shocks.
Kuttner (2018) surveys the evidence on the effectiveness of unconventional policy.
12
The June 2020 assessment of the Fed’s monetary-policy framework (Caldara et al. (2020)) cites effects
on the term premium from LSAP1 event dates of Gagnon et al. (2011).
13
The decomposition of the yields across maturities for the entire sample is available upon request.
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November and December 2008 (LSAP1), the 10-year yield fell by 119 basis points. The
YO and KO models, shown in the blue and red lines, attribute little of this decline to
the EH component (16-30 basis points across models). In contrast, results from the PSS
model, shown in the green lines, suggest that 41-46% of the fall in yields was due to changes
in expected short-term rates. We find a similar ordering of results during the months of
subsequent announcements (LSAP2 and FG). The third LSAP announcement had negligible
effects on yields. Finally, the EH component in yields increased markedly following the
announcement that the Fed would begin tapering its asset purchases, with most pronounced
effects for the PSS model. Narrowing in on three major event dates, Figure 7 plots the
cumulative change in the 10-year yield (black line) and EH components across models from
the month before LSAPs 1 and 2 and the introduction of calendar-based forward guidance
(FG). The bulk of the change in the 10-year yield following LSAP1 was due to changes in
term premia. In contrast, changes in the EH component were relatively more important
following LSAP2 and FG (which included the MEP announcement in September 2011). In
particular, the PSS models attribute a large fraction of the change in yields to changes in
expectations of future short-term rates, whereas the YO models attribute almost all of the
change to term premia.14
The PSS estimates imply, generally, a larger role for the EH component of yields (e.g.,
emphasizing the expected future short rates/forward guidance interpretation), similar to
the results of Bauer and Rudebusch (2014). The other models imply a modest (KO) or
nearly-nonexistent (YO) effect on expectations. In summary, the interpretation of how
major policy announcements affected yields appears to be sensitive to both the inclusion of
forecast data and to the structural assumptions about those forecasts. Given this sensitivity,
14

This result is consistent with the argument in Kim and Orphanides (2012), that (in an affine term
structure context) the short sample problem tends to lead to upward bias in the degree of mean reversion
of short rates. This would imply that they would be relatively less important for explaining long-term
yields. While a natural concern is that including forecasts “mechanically” increases the contribution of
the EH component of prices, the Monte Carlo evidence in Kim and Orphanides (2012) and the variance
decomposition reported in Appendix E suggest that estimates including forecasts generally imply a larger
role for the EH component in general because of the information they give about parameter estimates rather
than the Kalman smoother attempting to mechanically fit the forecasts.
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it is unsurprising that previous efforts have found mixed evidence on the precise effects of
policy announcements. However, the range of disagreement appears to be about whether
term premia explain the entire cumulative change in yields versus slightly more than half.

5.4

Supply effects and term premia

Previous studies have found that the composition of medium- to long-term Treasury securities
in the Fed’s portfolio can have sizable effects on yields.15 To the extent that LSAPs change
that composition, the effects could operate either through changes in the EH component of
yields or through the term premium. The former channel would suggest that LSAPs signal
changes in expectations of the path of future short-term rates (Krishnamurthy and VissingJorgensen (2011)). Alternatively, the Fed’s purchases could coincide with lower interest-rate
risk through the removal of aggregate duration of Treasury securities (Gagnon et al. (2011))
or changes in the scarcity of assets with similar maturities (D’Amico et al. (2012)). The
results in the previous section suggest that the majority of the change in yields during the
first round of LSAPs was due to changes in term premia. Hence, in this section, we examine
the channels for those changes in term premia.
To construct measures of Treasury supply, we first merge the CUSIP identifiers of all
outstanding U.S. Treasury securities from the Center for Research in Securities Prices with
the Fed’s weekly System Open Market Account (SOMA) holdings and Treasury buyback
operations. Following D’Amico et al. (2012), we proxy for local scarcity using privately held
nominal Treasuries (PHNT), the share of Treasury securities held by the private sector outside the Federal Reserve and U.S. government. We focus on the holdings of securities
with maturities ranging from 2 to 10 years as a share of total Treasury debt outstanding,
due to the Fed’s concentration in purchases of these assets in 2008. To proxy for duration
risk, we calculate the duration gap (DG), the difference between aggregate duration risk in
the 2-10 year maturity bucket and the duration of the on-the-run 10-year Treasury bond.
15

D’Amico et al. (2012) and Huther et al. (2017) provide thorough historical descriptions of the Fed’s
balance sheet policies.
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Aggregate duration risk is the sum of modified duration weighted by PHNT for each CUSIP.
In addition, we control for the slope of the term structure, proxied by the difference between
the 10-year and 2-year nominal Treasury yields. The regression equation is:

TP(10yr)t = β0 + β1 P HN T (m : 2 − 10)t + β2 DGt + β3 Slope(10-2yr)t−1 + ϵt

(22)

Table 3 displays results from these regressions. In the first column, we regress 10-year
U.S. Treasury yields (rather than term premia) against our local scarcity, duration, and slope
proxies. The adjusted R2 for this regression is about 55%. We then use the model-implied
monthly 10-year term premium as the dependent variable in regression (22) to examine
whether the impacts of policy differ across models. We find robust evidence that the duration
gap and slope significant explain 10 year yields and term premia. However, the local scarcity
measure is only significant in the regression models including term premia for the two KO
models and the YO3 model. D’Amico et al. (2012), using weekly data over the same sample
period, found point estimates of 4.34 and 123.47 for local scarcity and duration, respectively.
In both cases, these variables were robustly significant in explaining 10-year term premia.
Our estimated point elasticities on local supply are about half as large (for all but the
KO3 specification), while the elasticity of term premia with respect to the duration gap is
larger in the YO and KO models, but not for PSS. The difference in significance between
our results and those in D’Amico et al. (2012) is possibly attributable to the use of weekly
versus monthly data; our point estimates (while certainly in the same neighborhood as in
their paper) do not point to as large effects of local supply. As emphasized by Wu and
Xia (2016) and Bauer and Rudebusch (2016), the behavior of short-term rates (and hence
expected rates and term premia) is quite different for affine versus nonlinear models which
likely affects the results. Our suite of models suggests that the significance of local scarcity
is more sensitive to the underlying estimate of term premia than had been noted previously.
Setting aside statistical significance, we use the estimated point elasticities from the
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pre-2008 sample to predict the effects of changes in supply on yields and term premia.
D’Amico et al. (2013) document that the first (second) round of LSAPs decreased privately
held nominal treasuries by about 4.69% (6.98%) and decreased the average duration gap by
about 0.12 (0.10) years. Using our estimated results from Table 3, we calculate the predicted
change in 10-year Treasury yields and term premia, with results reported in Table 4. Based
on these estimates, we would have predicted yields to decrease by about 37.4 basis points
overall as a result of LSAP1 and 38.8 basis points as a result of LSAP2. We interpret these
numbers as the predicted change in yields attributable to the supply factors in the reducedform model. Term premia are predicted to fall between 23 and 33 basis points, depending
on the model. Given that the (predicted) change in yields must be attributed to either term
premia or expectations, we interpret the residual as the variation in short-rate expectations
that was induced by the supply changes from the LSAP programs. These effects are largest
for the PSS and YO models, but much smaller for the KO model.
We are cautious to not draw a causal interpretation from these regressions. We simply
note that the extent of disagreement about the size (and sign) of short-rate expectations
effects reported in Table 4 demonstrates the difficulty of precisely estimating these effects
using reduced-form methods. The robust finding across our six specifications is that the
change in duration is associated with economically and statistically significant changes in
term premia for 10-year Treasuries, while the association with changes in local supply are
only significant in some specifications; the estimated magnitude of duration effects is between
about 18% larger (KO3) to more than three times as large (YO2). The lack of robust
association and imprecision of the estimated magnitude of this channel of LSAPs is somewhat
at odds with some predictions of preferred habitats models of bond prices discussed by
D’Amico et al. (2012).

28

6

Conclusion

Using data on forecasts and financial prices, we estimate shadow rates, interest rate expectations, and term premia for US Treasury markets during the zero lower bound period
associated with the Great Recession. We extend on previous work by fully estimating a
nonlinear state space model, incorporating interest rate forecasts alongside forward rates,
and allowing for deviations from full information rational expectations. While there is qualitative agreement between most of our models about the effects of forward guidance, the
quantitative differences in level of the shadow rate and expected duration of the ZLB are
sizeable. We test for (and find) evidence of a structural break in the impact of policy on the
macroeconomy before and after the Great Recession for all but one of our models, and find
that all of our estimates imply relatively small effects of changes in the measured shadow
rate on unemployment and inflation relative to previous estimates. We robustly find that
the majority of the effect of LSAPs was on term premia, and that term premia were mainly
affected by changes in duration during the first two rounds of LSAPs.
We have not closely investigated whether innovations to the shadow rate were driven by
particular factor innovations that can be linked to macroeconomic or financial developments.
But our estimated factors are correlated with macroeconomic indicators such as labor market variables; like interest rate forecasts (Caldara et al. (2020)), forecasts of labor market
variables were also subject to substantial over-optimism and revision during the recovery
from the Great Recession. Accounting for variation in the yield curve using a macro-factor
structure, would be a natural next step.
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Figure 6: Decomposition of the 10-year U.S. Treasury yield (black line) during the ZLB. The
Expectations Hypothesis component of the 10-year yield is shown for the YO (blue line),
KO (red line), and PSS (green line) models. Results for the two-(three-)factor model are in
the upper (lower) panel.
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(a) LSAP1

(b) LSAP2

(c) FG

Figure 7: Decomposition of the change in the 10-year U.S. Treasury yield (black line) during
specific ZLB dates. All measures are shown related to the month preceding the following
events: LSAP1 (November 2008), LSAP2 (August 2010), the introduction of calendar-based
forward guidance (FG) (July 2011). The change in the Expectations Hypothesis component
of the 10-year yield is shown for the three-factor YO (blue line), KO (red line), and PSS
(green line) models. Results for the two-(three-)factor model are given by dashed (solid)
lines.
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PSS
3 fac
2.28
(1.42)

0.55
71

Adjusted R2
N
0.79
71

0.37***
(0.04)
0.86
71

0.51***
(0.04)
0.66
71

0.30***
(0.04)
0.92
71

0.94***
(0.07)

0.81
71

0.49***
(0.04)

0.83
71

0.52***
(0.05)

Table 3: Supply regressions: First column: coefficients from regression of 10-year U.S. Treasury zero-coupon yield on supply
factors and yield curve slope. Columns two through six: coefficients from regression of term premia on supply factors and
yield curve slope. ***,**,* indicate signfiicance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively calculated using the Newey-West
correction for standard errors.

-0.09*
(0.05)

213.26*** 168.23*** 144.91*** 168.87*** 149.55*** 121.95*** 104.92***
(26.66)
(18.93)
(19.54)
(20.70)
(43.55)
(19.35)
(21.65)

2.51
(1.58)

Slope (1mo lag)

Duration Gap

PHNT(m:2-10)

10yr
Yield

Sample: December 2002 - October 2008
Term Premia on 10-year Bond
YO
YO
KO
KO
PSS
2 fac
3 fac
2 fac
3 fac
2 fac
1.37
2.09*
2.65**
3.37*
2.30
(1.16)
(1.15)
(1.28)
(1.79)
(1.46)
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Table 4: Predicted effects from supply regressions: First column: predicted change (in basis points) of 10-year U.S. Treasury
zero-coupon yield due to duration and scarcity effects. Columns two through six: predicted change (in basis points) of term
premia due to duration and scarcity effects. ***,**,* indicate signfiicance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively
calculated using the Newey-West correction for standard errors.

Sample: December 2002 - October 2008
10yr
Term Premia on 10-year Bond
Yield
YO
YO
KO
KO
PSS
PSS
2 fac
3 fac
2 fac
3 fac
2 fac
3 fac
LSAP 1
Predicted effect from scarcity -11.76
-6.44
-9.81* -12.41** -15.79* -10.78
-10.68
Predicted effect from duration -25.59*** -20.19*** -17.39*** -20.26*** -17.95*** -14.63*** -12.59***
Total
-37.35*** -26.63*** -27.20*** -32.68*** -33.74*** -25.42*** -23.27***
Residual (expectations effects)
-10.73
-10.15
-4.67
-3.62
-11.93 -14.08*
LSAP 2
Predicted effect from scarcity -17.51
-9.59
-14.60* -18.48** -23.50* -16.05
-15.89
Predicted effect from duration -21.33*** -16.82*** -14.49*** -16.89*** -14.95*** -12.19*** -10.49***
Total
-38.83*** -26.41*** -29.09*** -35.36*** -38.46** -28.25** -26.38**
Residual (expectations effects)
-12.42
-9.74
-3.47
-0.38
-10.59
-12.45
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A

Explicit expressions from the Wu-Xia shadow rate
model
We include the complete expression for the recursions in Wu and Xia (2016). Interested

readers should refer to their paper for a complete derivation.

a¯n = δ0 + δ1

n−1
X

(ρQ )k µQ

(23)

k=0

n−1

1 X  Q j ′ Q ′ j ′
δ1 (ρ ) ΣΣ ((ρ ) ) δ1
an = a¯n −
2 j=0

(24)

bn = δ1 (ρQ )n

(25)

And

Et (st+n ) = a¯n + bn Xt

B

Examining beliefs during the ZLB period and the
usefulness of forecast data
Hamilton (2018) argues that event-study estimates of the impact of monetary policy

actions make it difficult to separately identify the pure effects of LSAPs from informational
effects. For example, figure B.1 shows the yield curve on US Treasuries at the end of day on
March 17, 2009 and March 19, 2009. On March 18, 2009, the FOMC announced it would be
maintaining a target for the Federal Funds rate at 0-25 basis points for an “extended period”
and expanded the scale of LSAPs.16 The shift in the long end of the yield curve conflates
16

The March 18 2009 FOMC statement included the following language: “The Committee will maintain
the target range for the federal funds rate at 0 to 1/4 percent and anticipates that economic conditions
are likely to warrant exceptionally low levels of the federal funds rate for an extended period. To provide
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this news about short term interest rates and economic conditions which affect risk premia.
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Figure B.1: US Treasury yield curve on March 17 (dashed) and March 19 (circles), 2009.
Data from Gürkaynak et al. (2007).

In principle, shadow rate models allow for the separation of these forces by identifying
the pure EH component of yields separately from risk premia, even when short term interest
rates are stuck at or near the zero lower bound. Forecasts are potentially an additional
source of information about expectations. Because the decision to use forecast data is not
innocuous (see Li et al. (2017)), it is worth briefly rationalizing our approach.
First, the Blue Chip panelists are primarily private sector forecasters, and policymakers
frequently make use of the Blue Chip surveys as an indicator of market expectations that
greater support to mortgage lending and housing markets, the Committee decided today to increase the
size of the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet further by purchasing up to an additional $750 billion of agency
mortgage-backed securities, bringing its total purchases of these securities to up to $1.25 trillion this year,
and to increase its purchases of agency debt this year by up to $100 billion to a total of up to $200 billion.
Moreover, to help improve conditions in private credit markets, the Committee decided to purchase up to
$300 billion of longer-term Treasury securities over the next six months.”
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are free of effects from priced risk premia, both in public speeches (see, for example, Clarida
(2019)) and internally as a benchmark (D’Amico et al. (2013), Cieslak (2018)). This is
consistent with their use in other shadow rate studies; for example, Bauer and Rudebusch
(2016) verify their model-based forecasts are sensible by comparing them to surveys.
Second, graphical evidence suggests that forecasts for short-term bond yields – which one
might expect have relatively small, if any, risk premia – are reasonably close to what would
be implied by prices. For instance, figure B.2 compares the yield on a 12-month zero coupon
Treasury bond to the average expected short-term interest rate over the next 12 months. In
general, the forecasts are consistent with prevailing prices.
12
12 month yield
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Figure B.2: Yields on 12 month Treasuries and average expected short rates of 12 month
Treasuries from the Blue Chip Financial Survey.
Third, and most importantly, our approach in this paper is neither to ignore forecasts or
assume they are the same as market expectations. We estimate several models that allow for
surveys to be identified with traders directly (a-la Kim and Orphanides (2012)), as well as
allowing for interest rate forecasts from surveys to be related to those implied by yields but
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possibly distorted (as in Piazzesi et al. (2015)). Allowing for distortion may be important
given a large literature (e.g. Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2015)) which has demonstrated
professional forecasts often significantly deviate from the FIRE benchmark.
To test for the existence of distorted beliefs in Blue Chip short-rate forecasts, we regress
future forecast errors on revisions of the same forecast (as in Coibion and Gorodnichenko
(2015)) in each month. Define Et [r̄t+n−2,t+n ] to be the consensus forecast made in month t of
the average level of short rates between months t + n − 2 and t + n.17 Because Additionally,
call F Et (r̄t+n ) = r̄t+n − Et [r̄t+n−2,t+n ] the forecast error from month t to month t + n and
F Rt (r̄t+n ) = Et [r̄t+n−2,t+n ] − Et−1 [r̄t+n−2,t+n ] the forecast revision between months t − 1 and
t.
We regress forecast errors across horizons n on forecast revisions:

F Et (r̄t+n ) = α(n) + β(n)F Rt (r̄t+n ) + ϵt+n

(26)

Under the null hypothesis of FIRE, rational expectations errors would be unpredictable
(β(n) = 0) as would be efficiently incorporating all information available at t. However, as
the results in figure B.3 suggest, such errors can be predicted using revisions to forecasts
from time t − 1 to t. This effect is nearly always significant at the 95% level. The results
imply that knowing forecasts for the next quarter had been revised upward by 25 basis points
between the first and second month of the current quarter implies a likely underestimate of
the actual average 3-month rate by around 25 basis points (despite the upward revision).
This economically and statistically significant result is inconsistent with FIRE.
While we believe surveys are a source of information about the beliefs of traders, we are
cognizant that there is a possible tension in (1) treating them as FIRE and (2) identifying
them with traders’ beliefs. Since the literature has not reached a consensus, we examine
whether our results are robust to assuming forecasts are FIRE or perhaps generated by a
distorted belief about the underlying state.
17

Further details of the construction of Blue Chip forecasts are provided in appendix C.

43

Appendix – for online publication

Figure B.3: Each line represents confidence intervals for coefficient estimates of forecast error
on forecast revision as in equation (26), by forecast horizon and month within the quarter.

C

Incorporating the Blue Chip Financial Forecasts Survey into the structural estimates
The Blue Chip Financial Forecasts survey has been conducted at a monthly frequency

since 1982. Survey participants are asked for their quarterly average forecasts of a range of
financial-market variables at horizons of 1- to 5-quarters ahead (6-quarters ahead beginning
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in 1997).18 The analysis in this paper utilizes forecasts of 3-month Treasury bill constantmaturity yields, which proxies for the risk-free short-term interest rate.
The Blue Chip survey is generally published on the first day of each month. However,
forecasters complete the survey over a two-day period in the prior week. We follow Cieslak
(2018) and choose the “survey date” to be the earliest business day in the range of the
23rd-27th of the month for January through November and the 17th-20th for December.
Yields used in estimation are selected on those dates to correspond with the forecasters’ true
information set.
Current-quarter forecasts published in the second and third months of a quarter already
contain past realizations of yields. To address this issue, we adjust forecasts for prior yields
within a given quarter.19 Consider the case of Q1 forecasts published in February. These
forecasts reflect interest rates that already occurred in January. We calculate a forwardlooking forecast by subtracting the average of 3-month interest rates (taken from the Fed’s
H.15 release) over the first three weeks of January. The two-month ahead forecast then
equals Et [r̄t+1,t+2 ] = (3 × Et [r̄t,t+2 ] − r̄t )/2. Now consider the case of Q1 forecasts published
in March, which are made in February. These forecasts reflect interest rates that already
occurred in January and the first three weeks of February. The one-month ahead forecast
subtracts the monthly average of yields in January and the average of the first three weeks
of February: Et [r̄t+1 ] = 3 × Et [r̄t−1,t+1 ] − r̄t − r̄t−1 . In both cases, the average of the first
three weeks of the month is assumed to be approximately equals to the monthly average.

D

Parameter estimates and model fit
This appendix first presents tables of the parameter estimates for each model. Following

that, figure D.1 plots the average fit for the yield curve during the zero lower bound period.
The top figure shows results for two-factor models, while the bottom shows results for three18

The Blue Chip also publishes long-horizon forecasts semi-annually, which we do not utilize due to the
sparse time series.
19
This procedure is identical to Xu (2019), except that we use a slightly different forecast horizon convention.
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1200µ

-0.1720
(0.0000)
ρ
0.9748
(0.0000)
-0.0123
(0.0000)
0.0007
(0.0000)
diag(ρQ )
0.9989
(0.0000)
1200Σ
0.2513
(0.0004)
-0.0795
(0.0009)
-0.0052
(0.0002)
0.1718
1200 r
(0.0000)
1200 δ0
13.5222
(0.0000)
1200 (yield meas. err) 0.1276
(0.0001)
Log Likelihood

-0.1515
(0.0005)
-0.0077
(0.0000)
0.9525
(0.0000)
0.0038
(0.0000)
0.9441
(0.0000)

-0.0000
(0.0002)
0.4629
(0.0000)
0.5926
(0.0000)
0.8502
(0.0000)
0.9754
(0.0000)

0.2235
(0.0003)
0.0054
(0.0001)

0.0311
(0.0003)

19798.5126

Table D.1: Estimated parameters for 3 factor model without forecasts (YO model). QMLE
standard errors in parentheses
figure models. The average yield curve implied by the model is shown by the individual
markers, while the actual yield curve is plotted as a solid line.
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1200µ

-0.1680
(0.0054)
ρ
0.9751
(0.0009)
-0.0160
(0.0006)
Q
diag(ρ )
0.9986
(0.0000)
1200Σ
0.2896
(0.0045)
-0.0303
(0.0032)
0.1972
1200 r
(0.0020)
1200 δ0
13.2356
(0.1723)
1200 (yield meas. err) 0.2180
(0.0021)
Log Likelihood

-0.2388
(0.0057)
0.0123
(0.0001)
0.9597
(0.0002)
0.9765
(0.0008)
0.0000
(0.0000)
0.3709
(0.0010)

18818.9941

Table D.2: Estimated parameters for 2 factor model without forecasts (YO model). QMLE
standard errors in parentheses
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1200µ

-0.1310
(0.0135)
ρ
0.9731
(0.0015)
-0.0055
(0.0017)
-0.0022
(0.0018)
diag(ρQ )
0.9981
(0.0009)
1200Σ
0.2615
(0.0355)
-0.0999
(0.0225)
-0.0126
(0.0136)
0.1132
1200 r
(0.0170)
1200 δ0
10.4698
(1.4299)
1200 (yield meas. err) 0.4017
(0.0246)
1200 (fcst meas. err)
0.0923
(0.0155)
Log Likelihood

-0.0550
(0.0012)
0.0248
(0.0384)
0.9762
(0.0055)
0.0026
(0.0086)
0.9568
(0.0006)

-0.0159
(0.0059)
-0.2807
(0.2537)
0.1227
(0.0402)
0.8548
(0.1239)
0.9185
(0.0256)

0.2555
(0.0719)
0.0065
(0.0076)

0.0269
(0.0088)

34368.0697

Table D.3: Estimated parameters for 3 factor model including forecasts (KO model). QMLE
standard errors in parentheses
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1200µ

-0.2503
(0.0003)
ρ
0.9597
(0.0006)
0.0050
(0.0005)
diag(ρQ )
0.9986
(0.0001)
1200Σ
0.4023
(0.0078)
-0.2303
(0.0051)
0.1235
1200 r
(0.0036)
1200 δ0
12.6821
(0.0686)
1200 (yield meas. err) 0.3470
(0.0185)
1200 (fcst meas. err)
0.2225
(0.0033)
Log Likelihood

-0.0925
(0.0031)
0.0077
(0.0013)
0.9576
(0.0002)
0.9808
(0.0001)

0.4366
(0.0007)

33221.2481

Table D.4: Estimated parameters for 2 factor model including forecasts (KO model). QMLE
standard errors in parentheses
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1200µ

-0.2376
-0.0967
(0.0026)
(0.0024)
ρ
0.9721
-0.0050
(0.0002)
(0.0169)
-0.0131
0.9453
(0.0040)
(0.0020)
0.0021
0.0034
(0.0004)
(0.0011)
diag(ρQ )
0.9976
0.9565
(0.0001)
(0.0078)
1200Σ
0.3809
(0.0163)
0.1763
0.3851
(0.0095)
(0.1358)
-0.0066
0.0037
(0.0001)
(0.0009)
0.1206
1200 r
(0.0025)
1200 δ0
13.8656
(0.1626)
k
-12.1696
-1.0860
(1.8598)
(1.7633)
-17.5792
-9.0648
(2.9041)
(1.4347)
39.5478
99.9749
(3.8120)
(0.2874)
1200 (yield meas. err) 0.2416
(0.0146)
1200 (fcast meas. err) 0.1236
(0.0195)
Log Likelihood
35301.4976

0.0196
(0.0005)
0.2241
(0.1309)
1.0963
(0.0190)
0.8501
(0.0176)
0.9153
(0.0191)

0.0337
(0.0029)

-99.9713
(0.3307)
60.0199
(0.0059)
60.0199
(0.0059)

Table D.5: Estimated parameters for 3 factor model with distorted forecaster dynamics (PSS
model). QMLE standard errors in parentheses

eig(ρ − Σk)

7.6162+9.3590i
7.6162-9.3590i
-7.0499

Table D.6: Subjective physical dynamics, 3 factor PSS model
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1200µ

-0.1256
-0.0240
(0.0005)
(0.0013)
ρ
0.9797
0.0111
(0.0001)
(0.0018)
-0.0014
0.9644
(0.0005)
(0.0009)
diag(ρQ )
0.9983
0.9707
(0.0000)
(0.0010)
1200Σ
0.2964
(0.0120)
0.0788
0.5049
(0.0010)
(0.0030)
0.1363
1200 r
(0.0040)
1200 δ0
13.3399
(0.0653)
k
11.8001
22.6209
(0.4909)
(0.0091)
-20.7000
-0.0854
(0.1755)
(0.2890)
1200 (yield meas. err) 0.2722
(0.0000)
1200 (fcast meas. err) 0.2027
(0.0031)
Log Likelihood
34021.7778
Table D.7: Estimated parameters for 2 factor model with distorted forecaster dynamics (PSS
model). QMLE standard errors in parentheses

eig(ρ − Σk)

-1.6466+7.9353i
-1.6466-7.9353i

Table D.8: Subjective physical dynamics, 2 factor PSS model

51

Appendix – for online publication

Figure D.1: Average fit of 2-figure (top) and 3-figure (bottom) model across years, using
smoothed state estimates. Line indicates average yield curve in the indicated year.
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E

Variance decomposition of yields
In this appendix, we report the variance decomposition of yields across models and hori-

zons. All of the models imply that the variation in short-maturity yields is due to expectations of future short-term rates. However, the YO and two-factor KO models attribute
relatively more of the variation in medium- and long-term yields to the term premium component than the other models. The PSS models and three-factor KO model cannot distinguish
between these two components for long-maturity bonds. The difference in results across models emphasizes that these decompositions are sensitive to the underlying structural model
and the presence of survey forecasts in the estimation.
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Figure E.1: Decomposition of unconditional variance of the level of yields into Term Premium and Expectations Hypothesis components for yields only, KO, and PSS models for the
full sample (1987-2018). Newey-West 99% confidence bands are shown for point estimates.
Maturity is reported in months.
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Figure E.2: Decomposition of unconditional variance of the change in yields into Risk Premium and Expectations Hypothesis components for yields only, KO, and PSS models for the
ZLB sample (1987-2018). Newey-West 99% confidence bands are shown for point estimates.
Maturity is reported in months.
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F

Additional ZLB duration figures
This appendix displays two additional figures on the expected duration of the ZLB after

the Great Recession. Figure F.1 focuses on the post-2011 period and groups together the
real-time expected mean duration across models, separated by the number of factors. Figure
F.2 compares the three-factor model point estimates of expected duration to those implied
by Wu and Xia (2016).
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Figure F.1: Real-time implied mean duration of ZLB period. Dashed lines indicate the
duration implied by the SEP liftoff dates.
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Figure F.2: Real-time implied mean duration of ZLB period for the three-factor model.
Dashed lines indicate the duration implied by the SEP liftoff dates. White squares are the
Wu and Xia estimates.

58

Appendix – for online publication

G

EKF estimates
In this section, we include comparisons between our results and ones estimated with the

extended Kalman filter. We focus on a three-factor, yields-only model. Unlike the main
results in the paper, but like Wu and Xia (2016), we use annualized yields data for the EKF
exercises (as opposed to estimating on un-annualized data and then annualizing after the
fact).
We compare four different sets of results. First, we employ the same procedure as is used
for the discretization filter – global minimization without constraining the lower bound of
the short rate r. We then restrict r = 0.25 as in Wu and Xia (2016), but use global search
and the complete dataset as in the previous case. We then use the same local search and the
same data as Wu and Xia (2016), but using smoothed state estimates. Finally, we include
the results obtained from Wu and Xia (2016)’s code. Average fits for each model during the
ZLB period (within the sample used to estimate) are shown in figure G.1. Within the period
2009-2012 (when all four sets of models are on equal footing), no model is clearly superior.
The estimated shadow rates (along with the Wu and Xia (2016) shadow rate) are shown
in figure G.2. Here, global search with an unrestricted ZLB yields nonsensical estimates
for the shadow rate (that are positive when the rate was constrained). Calibrating the
lower bound as in Wu and Xia (2016) gives an estimated path more similar to theirs. The
differences between the green and black shadow rates are attributable to differences between
smoothed and filtered estimates and the computing environment. Turning to the duration
plot (figure G.3), we see that both the sets of global search results give extremely long implied
horizons for the ZLB, while the local search is slightly more consistent with Wu and Xia
(2016). Notably, neither set of ’local’ results is completely consistent with the calendar-based
forward guidance provided by the FOMC, although the WX results are closer.
For the remainder of the comparison, we focus on comparing our main results with
EKF results estimated using global methods and a fixed lower bound at r = .25. We view
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Figure G.1: Predicted and actual forward curves for 3 factor YO model estimated with
extended Kalman filter. Blue line: Gürkaynak et al. (2007) forward rate curves. Square:
estimated with global search and without fixing r. Triangle: Global search with r = 0.25.
Circle: local search with r = 0.25. Plus sign: Results from Wu and Xia (2016).
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Figure G.2: Estimated shadow rates from 3 factor YO model estimated with extended
Kalman filter. Blue: estimated with global search and without fixing r. Red: Global search
with r = 0.25. Green: local search with r = 0.25. Black: Results from Wu and Xia (2016).
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Figure G.3: Implied duration of ZLB from 3 factor YO model estimated with extended
Kalman filter. Blue circle: estimated with global search and without fixing r. Red triangle:
Global search with r = 0.25. Green square: local search with r = 0.25. Black plus sign:
Results from Wu and Xia (2016) based on simulation. The black dashed corridor is the
implied range of liftoff dates based on the FOMC SEP as described in the main text.
.
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Table G.1: Table reports model fits for models estimated using the Extended Kalman Filter
as described in the text. The first column reports mean absolute error (MAE) while the
second column reports RMSE. Panel A contains estimates for the in-sample fit that uses
all observations (384 months). Panel B contains estimates for the out-of-sample fit, which
estimates the model each December from 2007-2018, and calculates forecasts for 1- to 12months ahead. MAE and RMSE are reported across all horizons (10 sets of forecasts at 12
horizons each).
Statistic

MAE
RMSE
Panel A: In-Sample Fit (N=384)
3 month
0.064
0.079
6 month
0.051
0.071
12 month 0.059
0.074
24 month 0.040
0.054
60 month 0.084
0.101
84 month 0.055
0.070
120 month 0.085
0.104
Panel B: Out-of-Sample Fit: 1-12 month-ahead forecasts (N=120)
3 month
0.507
0.899
6 month
0.557
0.936
12 month 0.671
1.018
24 month 0.951
1.228
60 month 1.213
1.492
84 month 1.149
1.385
120 month 0.929
1.128

this as being a more reasonable comparison to our main results because it does not imply
counterfactual short rates (unlike the case where r is estimated). We report the in-sample
fitting error in panel A of table G.1. Compared to the results in panel A of table 1, the
fitting errors are marginally smaller (within two or three basis points except for 10 years,
which have a 5 bp error). This suggests that the in-sample fit of the DF does not suffer
much due to approximating on a grid.
Next we turn to the pseudo-out-of-sample fit. Here, the EKF model does significantly
worse than the YO model estimated with the discretization filter, with forecast errors about
twice as large on average. The relatively poor performance is somewhat puzzling. Two
possibilities are that the EKF is over-fitting in the rolling sample, or that the (approximate)
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likelihood surface is flat (so that parameters are not well identified, and the estimation procedure happens to land on a set of parameters with particularly bad forecasting performance).
Finally, for the sake of comparison, we report the MSFAVAR estimates for the restricted
YO3 model. Figure G.4 reports impulse responses for both models with estimates from the
conventional (unconventional) regime shown in blue (red). For both models an unexpected
decrease in the fed funds/shadow rate leads to higher inflation and lower unemployment
rates on impact. However, in the unconventional state the inflation rate declines after two
years. In general, the magnitude of the impulse responses for the YO model are larger in
the unconventional state than those of the WX model, although both sets of responses are
within the other model’s confidence bands.
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Figure G.4: MSFAVAR IRFs: This figure displays impulse responses of the federal
funds/shadow rate (upper panel), the annual CPI inflation rate (middle panel), and the
unemployment rate (lower panel) to a one-standard deviation monetary shock. Estimates
calculated for the conventional (unconventional) regime are shown in blue (red). The units
of the horizontal axis are the number of months from the initial monetary shock. For each
model, the solid line displays the median estimate and the shaded bands indicate 68% confidence intervals. Estimates for the WX and YO3 (Extended Kalman Filter) models are
shown in columns 1 and 2, respectively.
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